But conditions in 1931 were a far cry from those prevailing in 1899. As Mellon himself observed pages later in the same annual report, 1931 had been "marked with an unprecedented number of [bank] suspensions," involving almost one and a half billion dollars in deposits.3 The banking crisis made the check tax an unlikely candidate for inclusion in the 1932 Revenue Act that, for the most part, "followed a path of least resistance," sparing those industries that had "the proper blend of political efficacy and precarious finances."4 Nevertheless, the drive to balance the budget, combined with the vagaries of the legislative process, first allowed the check tax to be adopted despite general opposition to the idea, and then caused the tax to be continued an extra six months despite widespread calls for its early repeal.
The House Rejects the Check Tax
Both Mellon and Undersecretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills insisted that a check tax would not appreciably increase the demand for cash. Theirs was, however, a minority opinion. Pressed on the point at the onset of the House Ways and Means Committee hearings on revenue revision in January 1932, Mills admitted that a check tax might "have a certain restrictive effect" on the banking industry by encouraging hoarding. Still, he insisted, "the best way to remove the fear that causes hoarding is to restore [confidence] , and one of the indispensable steps in the restoration of confidence is to balance ' The Check Tax 861 the budget."5 Mills's reasoning was strained, as there was at the time no obvious connection between bank runs and the federal deficit. In any event, the Ways and Means Committee was unpersuaded: to a man it rejected the check tax idea, finding that such a tax was likely to have much more serious consequences than the Treasury claimed.6 The Treasury's own position had been based on its $175 estimate of the mean value of a bank check. A two-cent tax was, of course, unlikely to cause any significant switch to currency for such large transactions. But the Treasury's figure came from data that included some very large financial transactions. The figure therefore hid the fact that the vast majority of checks, including checks for family expenditures, wage payments, and purchases by agricultural cooperatives, were written for much smaller amounts.7 For instance, according to the National Cooperative Milk Producers' Federation, as of 1932 dairy farmers had been receiving approximately 150 million checks annually, with a mean value per check of only $2.15. The proposed tax applied to such checks would therefore have been approximately equivalent to a one-percent tax on dairy products at a time when dairy industry profits were exceedingly slim or nonexistent.8 Similar circumstances prevailed, though on a smaller scale, in the poultry and egg industries. The committee was convinced that a check tax might sponsor a large scale switch to currency-based payments in these industries, at the expense of banks serving them.
The committee had even more reason to fear that a check tax would cause payrolls to return to a cash basis. Many firms had only recently been won over to using checks for payroll purposes, the result being that by early 1932 over $4 billion in payroll checks (including many for relatively small amounts) were being drawn annually.9 Employers told the Ways and Means Committee that a check tax could reverse this trend, encouraging even such large firms as General Electric (which was then issuing $2.7 million in payroll checks annually) "to go back to the old way" despite the entailed "risk to life and property."10 Such concerns caused the committee to conclude that, contrary to the Treasury's claims, a check tax might cause a considerable switch from bank deposits to currency. Committee members understood, furthermore, that such a switch would harm an already tottering banking and currency system. Bankers informed them that the tax would discourage new accounts while ' threatening old ones. The closing of small accounts would especially threaten struggling rural banks relying heavily on small accounts from which small check payments were made. The ensuing reduction of credit would in turn do further damage to the economy as a whole.11 In the end the committee concurred with a New Jersey banker's testimony that "if there ever was a time when money should be kept in the banks as distinguished from pockets and money tills, it is now."12 Indeed, such testimony had, in at least one witness's view, made the check tax "appear silly" as a revenue device.13 Confident that it had seen the last of Mellon's idea, the committee omitted the check tax from the revenue bill reported to the House on 8 March and passed by that body soon afterwards. 14 Yet the check tax was far from dead, as events would shortly prove.
The Check Tax is Revived by the Senate
By the time the Senate Finance Committee convened in April 1932, a further drop in government revenues, the defeat of a general sales tax, and powerful Republican opposition to any substantial increase in income tax rates combined to sponsor further consideration of various excise taxes, including the check tax. Although the weight of testimony was once again altogether opposed to a check tax, the committee nevertheless voted on 27 April in favor of a tax applicable to checks for five dollars or more only. 15 Such a truncated check tax would, the committee believed, yield $50 million its first fiscal year while avoiding any major switch to currency. 16 The clause exempting small checks was, however, abandoned on 5 May, in the course of a chaotic afternoon of logrolling culminating in a surprise Democratic Party action placing protective tariffs on imported lumber, coal, oil, and copper. According to that day's New York Times:
Certain Senators began trying to load down the bill with obnoxious provisions to force retraction of some of the votes already taken. Others tried to save their 'pet' taxes, and in the midst of this the tariff advocates sprang their surprise.... Practically every vote of the committee... was a reversal or change of some fonner ballot.
In the opinion of Finance Committee member Pat Harrison, the protectionist amendments "so dampened the enthusiasm" of other committee But Cannon spoke in vain. Pressed for time, and having rejected Cannon's earlier plea that they take a separate vote on the check tax so as "not to sign the death warrant of the home-town bank," House members were now obliged either to accept the bill as reported from conference or to convene another conference. 
The Term of the Check Tax is Extended, then Shortened
The check tax, along with other excise taxes included in the revenue act, took effect on 21 June 1932, and was originally supposed to remain in effect until 1 July 1934. However, a movement to repeal the tax was afoot within days of its passage. Letters condemning the tax poured into representatives' offices from all sections of the country, and congressmen again spoke out against the tax, to rounds of applause from their colleagues. By the time Congress went on holiday on 16 July, no fewer than five bills and two joint resolutions had been introduced calling for the measure's immediate repeal.
Yet, instead of being terminated ahead of schedule, the check tax would ultimately be extended an extra six months, expiring on 1 January 1935. Once again, this outcome was more inadvertent than a reflection of any genuine support for the tax measure itself. In its final days the first session of the Seventy-second Congress had the initiative, but lacked sufficient time, to repeal the check tax. In contrast, the lame-duck second session that reconvened on 5 December had the time but lacked the initiative. Although in all the Seventy-second Congress introduced more than a dozen bills aimed at repealing the tax, no action was taken on any of them. In March 1933 responsibility for ending the tax passed to the Seventy-third Congress.
Within a month the new Congress had introduced a dozen more bills calling for immediate repeal of the check tax. However, before any of these measures could be debated by the House Committee of Ways and Means, that body voted to extend all the excise taxes of the 1932 revenue act, including the check tax, an extra year as a means for financing the pending National Industrial Recovery Act. Although House members later spoke out against the decision to extend the check tax, a "gag rule" effectively prevented them from amending the committee's bill. Not until the Revenue Act of 1934 was passed on 8 February 1934, was Congress finally able to cut short the check tax, calling for it to end on 1 January 1935, or six months ahead of the other excise taxes extended by the NIRA. Other reports at the same time noted a reduced quantity of checks drawn (a common estimate of the decline was 20 percent) and an increase in cash transactions. One banker estimated that the check tax had caused the amount of currency in circulation to increase by 15 to 20 percent. Assuming that the tax did not cause an even larger increase in the monetary base, these figures imply equal or larger increases in the equilibrium currency-demand deposit ratio. Another banker observed that his bank "found it wise to increase the amount of currency we hold in the vault" to accommodate the public's increased resort to cash payments.37 To the extent that such additions to vault cash involved an overall increase in bank reserve ratios, they were a separate cause of monetary contraction. The switch to cash was enough to alarm even check manufacturers: an advertisement from the Gilbert Safety Bond Company declared, optimistically, that although "the first reaction to the tax" was an increased demand for currency, "sober analysis of the dangers of pickpockets, loss and unthrifty influence in carrying large amounts of cash will soon bring depositors back to the habit of using even more checks."38 But the public's response to the check tax was not just a temporary overreaction. By January 1933 monthly revenues from the tax were still only To some extent the check tax could be avoided without resort to currency by using a single check to pay several bills or by paying wages less frequently. In July 1932 the New York Times reported a "growing movement on the part of buyers" to obtain extended credit as a means for making only monthly payments on all transactions.42 Such strategies were evident in statistics for "outside" clearings through the Federal Reserve banks, which showed an average increase of 14.1 percent in the amount per check, and an average decline of 15.2 percent in the number of checks, between December 1932 and December 1933.43 However, because they refer to long-distance payments only, for which cash is not convenient, these "outside" clearing statistics give a false impression of the extent to which the "lumping" of check payments was a preferred means of avoiding the check tax. In local payments, the ABA Journal observed, a similar reduction in the number of checks most probably had as its counterpart, not larger checks, but an increased use of cash, with a corresponding, negative impact on the money stock.44
Statistical Analysis
Although the behavior of the currency-demand deposit ratio during the early 1930s has been the subj-ect of numerous econometric studies, most of them entirely overlook the check tax. To examine the effects of the tax here, this study estimates a vector autoregression (VAR) model of the currency-demand deposit ratio and the money stock and their conventionally cited determinants (bond yields, deposit interest rates, transactions variables, and bank failures), to which are added an exogenous variable that measures the additional real cost of writing checks attributable to the check tax. 43ABA Journal (January 1933), p. 48. 44Bank customers could use specially prepared bank "cash receipts" to obtain cash from their accounts without paying the tax. But such receipts were not transferable.
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During the check tax period, this variable equals the magnitude of the check tax (normalized to one) deflated by the price level; otherwise, the variable is zero. The VAR approach has important advantages over conventional studies of the currency-demand deposit ratio: it avoids strong restrictions on exogeneity of the variables in the system, as well as improbable constraints on the dynamic structure of the data.45
The main concern here is with the dynamic effects of the check tax on the equilibrium values of the currency-demand deposit ratio and the money stock. These effects are measured in two ways. First, the coefficient estimates of the contemporaneous and lagged values of the check tax in the currency ratio and money stock equations are reported. These estimates measure the effects of the tax, holding the lagged behavior of all variables in the system constant. Second, the dynamic multipliers of the check tax are reported. These multipliers represent the general equilibrium effects of the tax on the currency-demand deposit ratio and money stock over various horizons.
A 48The check tax was assessed on all checks cleared on or after 21 June. Some switching to cash payments may have occurred prior to that date to avoid a tax charge on temporarily undeposited checks. Table 1 , show a check tax effect on the currency-demand deposit ratio (C/D) that is both statistically significant and economically important. Although the impact effect of the tax on the currency-demand deposit ratio is relatively small and significant only at 12.6 percent, the lagged effect is stronger and significantly positive at 1.5 percent. In contrast, both the impact and lagged effects of the tax on the MI money stock are negative and statistically significant at low levels, with the impact effect the larger of the two. For both C/D and Ml, the F-statistic testing the joint hypothesis that both the impact and lagged effects are zero rejects the null at less than 2.4 percent.49 Figure 1 plots the estimated dynamic multipliers of the logs of the currency-demand deposit ratio and Ml with respect to the check tax, along with asymmetric standard error bands from a bootstrap simulation of 500 replications. This standard error band gives some indication of the statistical significance of the dynamic effects. On impact, the check tax causes the equilibrium value of the currency ratio to increase by 3.5 percent. The ratio then continues to grow for the better part of a year until it is about 15 percent above its initial value. The dynamic response of Ml is similar, though of course in the opposite direction. For each variable, the dynamic responses are large relative to the standard error bands.
To further illustrate the influence of the check tax, a simulated contraction-era time series for the currency-demand deposit ratio and Ml in the absence of the check tax is obtained using the results reported previously. ratio.51 The coefficient estimates for this model, shown in Table 2 Yet another factor that may have contributed to a rise in the currency-ratio and decline in the money stock in the early 1930s was the introduction of service charges on bank deposit accounts. As Phillip Cagan notes, although such charges "were not common before the 1930s," when they were first imposed is not known, and charges (equal to about two-tenths of one percent of the face value of bank deposits) were not separately reported before 1933.54 Therefore, it is difficult to control for these service charges in the regressions. However, the available data suggest that service charges rose steadily as a percentage of total deposits after the check tax was repealed. It therefore seems unlikely that omitting service charges substantially biases the main findings.
To rise in the currency-demand deposit ratio over the period, and for between 24.9 and 38.4 percent of the decline in Ml. These results are broadly consistent with, and lend further credibility to, the initial findings.
CONCLUSION
Although monetary historians have tended to overlook it, the check tax enacted as part of the Revenue Act of 1932 seems to have had an important influence on the currency-demand deposit ratio and the money stock in the early 1930s. The tax gave the public yet another motive for withdrawing cash from the banking system, and the public responded accordingly, contributing to deflationary pressures that were already extreme.56 But the significance of the check tax extends beyond its purely monetary implications. The check tax was enacted by legislators who were informed of its likely, adverse monetary consequences, but who chose to overlook them in their endeavor to balance the budget. More perhaps than any other measure, the check tax stands as a symbol of depression-era attitudes towards both fiscal and monetary policy.
